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Abstract
This paper explores possible reasons for persistent spatial unemployment disparities using
agent-based computational methods. The method relies on observing the actions of thou-
sands of individuals within an artificial society. The paper models the effect of unemployment
insurance, wage disparities, region specific amenities and innate residential preferences on
regional labour market interactions, accounting for both migration and commuting. An em-
pirical example of Rogaland county in south-west Norway is given, where unemployment
disparities have proved remarkably persistent for decades. The model provides non-trivial
insight into the nature of spatial unemployment disparities as well as making a valuable
contribution to the policy debate.
1 Introduction
It is well known in the literature that unemployment rates tend to vary systematically between
regions. For example, Partridge and Rickman (1996) found significant levels of dispersion in US
state unemployment rates in the 1970s and early 1990s. Evans and McCormick (1994) studied
changes in the regional pattern of unemployment in the UK since the 1970s. Utilising results
from OECD-studies, they begin their analysis with the observation that regional unemployment
differentials have been strikingly persistent for a very long period, both in the UK and in other
OECD countries.
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In their seminal work, Blanchard and Katz (1992) discuss mechanisms which should operate
to close such disparities: migration, firm relocation and wage adjustments. In some cases, as
in the empirical example presented in their paper, such mechanisms work and disparities are
low. However, the existence of persistent disparities in many countries requires an alternative
explanation. The main explanations centre either around frictions in the process of adjustment
or some kind of equilibrium explanation for disparities.
The problem with the current literature (reviewed by Elhorst, 2003)is that approaches tend
to focus on only one explanation at a time and tend to ignore either migration or commuting
in order to provide a model simple enough for analysis. This is potentially a major weakness in
such approaches as the limitations imposed on their conclusions are not clear. It is the ambition
of this paper to simultaneously model migration, commuting, frictions in the equilibrating forces
and equilibrium explanations of regional unemployment rates. Due to the fact that even a large
number of simplifying assumptions would leave an analytical model completely intractable,
a micro-simulation model is used (for reviews discussions of computational methods see, for
example, Testfatsion (2001, 2003) or Epstein (1999)).
A two region economy populated by an artificial society of heterogeneous, utility maximising
agents is simulated as a base to conduct various experiments. The aim of these experiments is
to ascertain the relative strength of various factors in the adjustment process as well as to gain
an understanding of when and why persistent unemployment disparities arise. The agents in
the model are realistic in that they will be born, age, marry, divorce, give birth, retire and die.
Conditional probabilities of such events occurring will be based on Norwegian statistical data
in order to incorporate as many real world features as possible. Agents will be able to apply for
work in either region in the economy and will be free to choose whether to migrate or commute.
They will also be able to choose not to work at all. The outcome of this decision will depend
on the utility function of the individual and, if appropriate, their family.
An empirical example will be provided to compare with the output of the model. The
example of spatial unemployment patterns in south west Norway are used. Disparities in this
area have been highly persistent. Possible explanations for this will be discussed using the
output of the simulation model.
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2 Regional unemployment disparities
A brief review of the literature on spatial unemployment disparities will be presented in this
section to provide a foundation for the model presented later. Spatial unemployment disparities
can be divided into two main types: equilibrium and disequilibrium disparities. Equilibrium
disparities can be divided into two types based on different traditions in the literature: expected
wage explanations (Harris and Todaro, 1970) and amenity based explanations (Marston, 1985).
This paper will construct a framework which is capable of modelling all of these explanations
in a context where both commuting and migration are possible.
2.1 Disequilibrium unemployment disparities
The best model to describe disequilibrium differentials is provided by Blanchard and Katz (1992)
in their seminal work on spatial unemployment disparities in the US. In this model disparities
are quickly eliminated by migration flows, firm relocations and wage adjustments. However,
there is significant evidence from many countries that disparities are not eliminated quickly and
persist in the long run. The main reason for persistent differentials in this framework would be
frictions in the system preventing the equilibrating mechanisms from working.
2.1.1 Migration
The main evidence on migration comes largely from the US and Europe with results which
differ significantly. For example, Puhani (2001) studied labour mobility within the European
Union and found that migration did not play a significant role in the adjustment of the economy
following a regional shock. Fidrmuc (2004) found that while wage differentials are statistically
significant in determining the flow of migrants in the EU transition countries, the overall effect
of the migration is negligible. Decressin and Fa´tas (1995) compared Europe to the US and
found that changes in relative labour demand tend to be met by migration in the US but that
in Europe they are met with changes in the participation rate. Bentivogli and Pagano (1999)
also compared the US and EU. They found that migration is much more influenced by wage
differentials in the US than in Europe. In the EU, migration is more sensitive to a wage risk
factor measured by the variability of income than in the US. They also found that migration is
unresponsive to rising unemployment in Europe but not in the US.
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2.1.2 Firm relocations
Considerably less research has been undertaken with the aim of understanding firm relocation
decisions. Maoh and Kanaroglou (2007) provided a recent review of the literature on the subject.
Some of the main points are that firms prefer to stay in their present location if possible (Bade,
1983), fairly significant regional deficiencies are required to induce a firm to move (Van Wissen
2000) and that the main determinates of moving decisions are internal factors (Brouwer et al,
2004). Maoh and Kanaroglou (2007) also found that when most firms moved, they tended to
move only a short distance, usually within the same region. They also found that it tended
to be small firms which moved. This suggests that the percentage of jobs which moved as a
result of firm relocation decisions would be small. Alternative theoretical explanations of firm
behaviour are presented by van Dijk and Pellenbarg (2000) in which firms are less responsive
to local labour market conditions. Diamond and Simon (1990) even find evidence that many
firms prefer to locate in high wage cities in order to benefit from agglomeration effects. This
makes the exact relationship between firm relocation decisions far more complicated than the
one posited in the Blanchard and Katz (1992) framework.
2.1.3 Wage flexibility
A significant amount of research has taken place to establish how flexible wages are in response to
shocks. Jimeno and Bentolila (1998) examined the problem of persistent regional unemployment
in Spain between 1976 and 1994. They found that wages were very unresponsive to any regional
economic conditions, including unemployment. They believed this was caused by union power
and centralised wage setting. In a study of differences between EU regions, Abraham (1996)
found that wages showed little sign of adjusting after a shock and that inter regional migration
was very low compared to the US. In a more recent study, Buettner (2007) found that it took
the old EU-15 countries around twice as long to adjust to a shock as the new EU accession
countries. Siebert (1997) also concluded that wages in the EU failed to adjust and that this is
the caused by sclerotic labour market institutions.
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2.2 Equilibrium unemployment disparities
Rather than assuming that disparities will be closed in the long run, this class of models con-
siders situations where an economy will reach an equilibrium state with potentially large spatial
disparities present.
2.2.1 Expected wages
Harris and Todaro (1970) describe disparities as arising from differences in the expected wage
rather than absolute values of unemployment and wages. Their work takes place in the context
of developing economies although is also relevant in other cases. They model a two sector
economy where workers can choose to migrate from a low unemployment rural area to a high
unemployment urban area. In the model, the wages in the urban sector are higher than in the
rural sector. People may choose to migrate from the rural to urban despite the higher level
of unemployment in the urban sector because the expected wage is higher in the urban sector.
The key point here is that even though the risk of unemployment is higher, migration is optimal
because this is compensated for by higher wages. Only when the expected wage is equal in
both sectors does migration cease. This equilibrium does not require an even distribution of
unemployment or equal wages in both regions.
2.2.2 Amenity theories
In the model developed by Marston (1985), rather than considering the wage rate alone, workers
consider the total utility of living in a particular area. Their utility is a function of wages, as
in the traditional approaches, but also of the area amenities or characteristics. In this model,
a worker may choose to live in an area with high unemployment because they are compensated
by the amenities offered by the region. For this reason, it would be expected that a region with
high amenity value would have a higher unemployment rate and therefore lower expected wages.
3 The Model
This section develops the micro-simulation model on which the paper is based. In this style of
model there is no top-down structure imposed. Instead, rules governing individual behaviour
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are defined and then agents are free to interact within these rules. These rules are set out in
this section.
The first stage in the process is to define an initial population. In this case, the starting
level of 5,000 was chosen. Each individual has the following attributes: sex, age, marital and
parental status, place of birth, current address, work location, salary and utility parameters. In
order to ensure that the population evolves beyond its initial starting point, the system is run
over a period of 500 years before stabilising at a “normal population”, i.e. a population with a
reasonable number of people in every age group. This first initiation phase is run without letting
any agents take up employment. These steps are run on a monthly basis for every agent in the
model with the conditional probabilities of the events occurring based on Norwegian data.
3.1 Birth, marriage, divorce, ageing, work and death
Any adult woman in the model can give birth with the probability of doing so being conditional
on age. The birth rate was based on Norwegian data with a slight adjustment made to achieve a
stable population level suitable for experimentation. The sex of a child is determined randomly.
If the woman is not married, the father is drawn randomly from the population of single men.
Children are converted to adults when they reach the age of 15. At the age of 70, people are
retired. Adults can marry, divorce, have children and apply for work. Mortality rates are based
on standard life insurance tables, using Gompertz-Makeham’s law (Gompertz, 1825; Makeham,
1867) i.e. that the death intensity of a man of age x is given by the function:
µ = α+ βc where α = 0.9, β = 4.4 · 10−5 and c = 1.10154 (1)
These are the values that are commonly used by Norwegian insurance companies. Death
rates of women are adjusted by a 3 year age correction. The death rates we have used in the
simulation are hence conditional on both age and sex.
Every month, any unmarried agent can get married with the probability being conditional
on age, sex and previous marital status. Spouses are drawn from the population of single people,
with those living in the same region more likely to be selected. Candidates living in the opposite
zone have their chances degraded by the function:
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max
[
−emarriagedeterrence·d, 0.01
]
(2)
where d is the distance between the zones. The system does not allow large age differences;
a woman cannot be more than 5 years older or 15 younger than a man. The spouse moves to
the same address as their partner and brings any children with them. Married adults can be
divorced with probabilities being conditional on age and sex.
Any adult can apply for work. In this paper we consider a simplified situation with homo-
geneous jobs and workers and where the salary is allowed to vary between the two zones. An
agent only applies for work if they will experience a net gain in utility. Successful applicants are
randomly selected with unfilled vacancies carried over to the next period. No workers are fired
in the mode with vacancies only becoming available when workers move, retire or die.
3.2 Utility considerations
Each individual is equipped with a utility function Uαβ of the form:
Uαβ(V,W ) = (V + Ω)αW β (3)
Here V is a monetary component while W represents a location preference. The param-
eter Ω represents the willingness to pay for a location-specific amenity attached to a region.
The amenity can for instance be related to an attractive coastline, clean air, the presence of
cultural activities, more diversified labour market opportunities, or the accessibility to adminis-
trative services. Theoretically, Ω could also be negative, representing crime rates, congestion, or
other environmental disamenities. As a simplifying assumption the monetary evaluation of this
amenity is equal for all citizens in the economy, though this assumption can easily be relaxed.
For most of the experiments to be reported in this paper Ω = 0. Residential site preferences
may, however, also be related to the place of birth, that is to childhood experiences as well social
familiarity with a community (Partridge and Rickman 1997). This kind of location preference
is defined by the expression:
W = e−γd (4)
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where d is the distance to the individual’s place of birth. The parameters (α, β, γ) quan-
tify the strength of the preferences. The distance deterrence parameter γ is constant for all
individuals with the same place of birth, but can differ between zones. The parameters α, β
quantify how much weight an individual puts on money versus location. These parameters are
drawn randomly at birth. In this paper we assume that α and β are independent and uniformly
distributed over the interval (0.5, 1). Other types of utility functions and other choices for the
distribution of parameters are of course possible.
3.3 Movement
Every individual in the model considers moving, on average, once per year. If an agent consid-
ers moving, the system compares the utility offered by the available alternatives. This utility
consideration is based on the probability of obtaining work in the two zones, determined by
averaging unemployment rates over the previous 12 months. This determines two probabilities,
p1 and p2. The workers are myopic and assume that these probabilities are constant in the
future. Based on these probabilities, agents calculate their expected total salary given their
expected total lifetime. Each possible salary is discounted at a rate of 7% and multiplied by the
probability that he or she obtains that particular salary (net of commuting costs).
3.3.1 Example of moving decision utility comparison
Assume that a person with age t is unemployed, let w0 denote unemployment insurance and let
w1 and w2 denote the salaries (net of commuting costs) in the two zones. If w0 < min[w1, w2]
and w1 < w2, can the transition matrix, M , be computed as follows:
M =

1− p1 − p2 + p1p2 p1 − p1p2 p2
0 1− p2 p2
0 0 1
 (5)
The expected salary Si after i years is then given by the expression:
Si =
M i

w0
w1
w2


(1)
(6)
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where the superscript 1 means that the first component of the vector inside the brackets is
computed. Retirement takes place after the individual has reached 70 years of age. The total
expected salary is then given by the expression:
V0 =
∑70−t
i=0
Si · e−ρi +
∑Tt
i=70−t+1S70−t · e
−ρi · 0.66 (7)
Here S70−t is the expected salary at the time of retirement. In Norway the pension is typically
66% of that value. Tt is the expected remaining lifetime of a person of age t. The value of Tt is
computed using Gompertz-Makeham’s law. The individual then computes:
V0 =
∑70−t
i=0
Si · e−ρi +
∑Tt
i=70−t+1S70−t · e
−ρi · 0.66−mr (8)
where m is the cost of moving to the applicable region. This redefines the salaries net of com-
muting cost, so all the components in Equation (6) must be updated. An individual considering
moving computes the monetary values V0 and V1 above. Then he or she computes location
values W0 (using present address) and W1 (using alternative address). The next stage is to
compute the two utility values Uα,β(V0,W0) and Uα,β(V1,W1). If the person is unmarried, he
or she decides to move if Uα,β(V1,W1) > Uα,β(V0,W0). If the person is married, however, the
same calculation is carried out for the spouse. The results are added and the couple moves if
the alternative location provides a larger total utility. The utility of both spouses is given equal
weight.
3.4 Wages and job creation/destruction
The initial population was generated from a situation with exogenously given values for the
spatial distribution of wages and basic sector activities. It is not, however, always reasonable to
consider wages to be insensitive to employment shocks. Some of the literature discussed shows
that wages can vary in response to shocks. Economic theory certainly suggests that they should,
so it is important that this is modelled here. Wages are assumed to behave according to the
following expression:
w
(t)
i = w
(t−1)
i
(
1 +
U
(t)
i − U (t−1)i
U
(t−1)
i
)−µ
, µ > 0, i = 1, 2 (9)
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where w is the wage and U is the number of unemployed people. The subscript i denotes
the region while µ models the sensitivity of wages to changes in the level of unemployment.
The expression corresponds to a standard specification of the Phillips curve. In our numerical
experiments it is set to a value of 0.1. This is based on the work of Blanchflower and Oswald
(1994,1995) and their wage curve which gives an empirical relationship between changes in
unemployment and wages.
It is also possible to model wages as exogenous where they do not respond to local economic
conditions. There are several reasons justifying such an approach. One is that such a situation
corresponds to a New Keynesian style framework where wages are inflexible due to rigidities in
the system such as union power and centralised wage setting. In such an economy, adjustments
would have to take place through employment and output changes rather than through wage
changes. Another reason is that the assumption of exogenous wages gives us the opportunity to
study partial effects of other exogenous changes, and to identify the direction and strength of
other competitive mechanisms, that may initiate price adjustments in, for instance, the labour
market. Finally, it is straightforward to verify that persistent spatial wage disparities are ob-
served in many economies. The literature provides several explanations of such observations,
based on relationships that are not endogenously accounted for in our approach. Combes et al.
(2008) distinguish between three broad sets of explanations for such observations. One strand of
explanation focuses on differences in non-human endowments (for instance due to a favourable
location, climate, or natural resources). A second alternative focuses on interactions-based ex-
planations and the division of labour. Wages may be higher in thicker labour markets with a
greater division of labour, and easier matching of skill and labour demand (see Combes et al.
2008). Another type of interactions-based explanation is found in the “new economic geogra-
phy” literature, where the clustering of production activities typically results in a net effect of
increasing returns, transport costs and agglomeration economies in specific production sectors.
This literature contributes spatial equilibrium models where wage disparities typically depend on
transportation costs between the regions, see for instance Fujita et al. (1999). Alonso-Villar and
Chamorro-Rivas (2001), for instance, argue that knowledge-based industries tend to clustered in
one region, while more traditional industries are located in other regions, where wages are lower
in scenarios with relatively low transport costs between the regions. As a third explanation of
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spatial wage disparities Combes et al. (2008) focus on spatial differences in the skill composition
of the workforce.
The opportunities for employment are split into two parts: the local sector and the basic
sector. The number of jobs in the local sector is endogenous to the model. The size of the
local sector in a region is proportional to its population, as is always assumed in economic base
theory. No workers are fired and there are no vacancies until workers retire or find alternative
work. The number of basic sector jobs can be treated as endogenous or exogenous to the model
(as with wages). When they are modelled as endogenous, they respond to changes in wages in
the model as follows:
B
(t)
i = B
(t−1)
1
(
1 +
w
(t)
i − w(t−1)i
w
(t−1)
i
)−η
, η > 0, i = 1, 2 (10)
Where w is the endogenous wage (see Section 3.4) and η models the sensitivity of jobs to changes
in the wage. This elasticity is set to unity in the model. When wages are exogenous, the number
of basic sector jobs is effectively exogenous since wages do not change over time. We also
ignore the impact of other factors that may influence location decisions of basic sector firms
systematically. It would be possible to introduce a stochastic component to this mechanism to
introduce friction into the system although this is not included here.
3.5 Preparing the model for experimentation
Before experimenting with the model it was necessary to ensure that the system was stable so
that comparisons could be made. If, for instance, the population was falling and a negative
shock hit, the effects, with respect to unemployment rates, would tend to cancel each other out.
This would complicate the analysis.
One of the key variables of interest is the distance between the two regions in the model.
These distances have two effects. Firstly, they increase the cost of commuting between the
regions. Secondly, they increase the psychological costs of moving. In total, 5 different distances
were modelled: 20, 50, 80, 110 and 140 kilometres. A separate initial population was needed
for each of these systems since the development of the population will depend, in part, on the
distance between the two regions. When trying to select a birth rate which would give a system
with a stable population, it was observed that a rate which was stable for a system with 140 km
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between the zones would not give stable population for a system with 20 km between the zones.
After some investigation, it was discovered that this was caused by the stochastic processes in the
model. Different outcomes were observed depending on what random numbers were generated.
This would not be problematic were it not for the fact that the aim of the study is to compare
how different systems respond to a shock. If the systems are different to start with, then it is
difficult to make such comparisons. Different sets of random numbers were used for each system
so that the population was stable. This meant that the population used in each experiment was
not identical, even though the rules governing their behaviour were the same.
At first this may seem strange, as it would be expected that in order to draw valid com-
parisons everything should be identical in all models except for the distance between the zones.
Rather than this being a weakness it is a strength of the approach as stochastic processes are
present in the real word. If each population is thought of as a separate economy, then the process
equates to studies which compare economies which have certain things in common. Examples
of doing this in order to draw comparisons can be found many times in the literature. For ex-
ample, Weiler (2005) compared how West Virginia and west German labour markets responded
to shocks because “aggregate joblessness is similar in the two areas” (pp. 441-442). Bornhorst
and Commander (2006) examined the causes of regional unemployment persistence in transition
countries because all of these countries have certain things in common.
At the end of this process, each economy had a population of around 18,000 divided ap-
proximately equally between both regions. The number of jobs in each region was defined in
such a way as to give unemployment rates of around 5% to represent the natural rate of un-
employment. Different sizes of populations were experimented with. With small populations,
stochastic processes can tend to dominate and the results can be slightly unstable. As the
population increases, the system becomes more stable. After a certain point, the only effect on
increasing the number of agents is an increase in the computational resources required to run
the model. A population of 18,000 seems more than sufficient to obtain a stable system.
4 Simulation experiments
The aim of this paper is to understand how unemployment differentials between regions arise
and why they persist over time. In order to achieve this, the model economy developed was
12
subjected to a number of shocks, and the response of the unemployment rates in both regions
monitored for a 20 year period. The response of the economy to the shocks was monitored with
different levels of friction in the system. One of the main ways in which this was modelled was
by changing the distance between the zones. Firstly, this increases the cost of commuting to a
job in the opposite zone. Secondly, it increases the utility cost of moving since an individual has
a preference to live in the zone in which they were born.
The shock modelled in this paper is the removal of 1000 jobs (25% of basic sector employment)
from Region 1. As no workers in this model are fired, these jobs are removed through natural
wastage i.e. workers retiring, moving or dying. This means that it takes some years for the
shock to take full effect. This effect would correspond to a country where employment law
prevents workers from being fired. It would be possible to model a situation where workers lost
their jobs immediately. This would raise the question of which workers should lose their jobs.
It could be random, or based on tenure or age (operating as proxies for human capital). This
is unimportant in the current context since it is the equilibria before and after the shock which
are of primary interest.
The parameters to be changed along with their default values are: unemployment insurance
(300,000 NOK pa); wages in Region 2 (400,000 NOK pa); the cost per km of commuting (2.5
NOK); the willingness to pay for the amenity in Region 1 (Ω = 0) and the strength of the resi-
dential site preference (β ∼ U [0.5, 1]). In order to allow the effect of the shock to be monitored,
the model will be run for the initial 100 year period with all of the parameters at the default
level, the model will then be run for a further 10 years with a parameter change and then the
system will be shocked and monitored for 20 years. This should allow the effect of the parameter
change and the shock to be separated.
 
Initialisation:
500 years
Development 
period: 
100 years
Policy 
adjustment 
period: 
10 years
Post shock 
observation:
20 years
Figure 1: The time line of the model.
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4.1 The effect of varying unemployment insurance
The effect on the adjustment process to the shock was monitored for unemployment insurance
rates of 200,000, 250,000, 300,000 and 350,000 NOK. Changes to the level of unemployment
insurance had no significant effects in the system with 20 km between regions. This is since the
cost of moving or commuting is so low that it is beneficial to take action to gain employment
even if the excess of wages over unemployment insurance is small. The system with a distance
of 50 km did not respond significantly to a decrease in the level of unemployment insurance but
increasing it to 350,000 NOK caused a substantial unemployment disparity to appear when the
employment shock was introduced, see Figure 2 (the 80 km system behaves in a similar way).
20%
25%
Unemployment
0%
5%
10%
15%
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
(a) 300,000 NOK
20%
25%
Unemployment
0%
5%
10%
15%
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
(b) 350,000 NOK
Figure 2: The effect of a change in Unemployment Insurance: 50 km between Regions with 1000
jobs removed from Region 1 (unbroken line) in year 20.
While these results appear simple and highly intuitive, they are underpinned by extremely
complex behaviour at the micro level. In Figure 2(a), the minor unemployment disparities which
emerge are purely disequilibrium and are quickly eliminated in the style of the Blanchard and
Katz (1992) model. In Figure 2(b), an equilibrium disparity emerges which is not eliminated
even in the long run. The nature of this disparity is complicated and can only be understood
by utilising the work of Harris and Todaro (1970) and Marston (1985).
It is helpful to consider part of the logic which individuals in the model use. An unemployed
agent, living in Region 1, who has applied for work and who cannot migrate has an annual
expected wage of:
E[Y ] = Φ + (1− u1)(w1 −Φ) + (1− u2)(w2 −Φ−C12)− (1− u1)(1− u2)(w2 −Φ−C12) (11)
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where Y is income, Φ is unemployment insurance, ui is the unemployment rate in Region i,
wi is the wage rate in Region i and C12 is the cost of commuting from Region 1 to Region 2.
This exact equation is not part of the model but is useful as an explanatory device. Firstly,
the agent can always claim unemployment insurance so this appears in their expected earnings.
The probability of obtaining work in their region of residence decreases as the unemployment
rate in that region rises. The marginal benefit will be equal to the excess of wages over the
unemployment insurance payment. In this case, it will always be positive because wages are
assumed to be exogenous meaning that the worker will always take an available job in the
region in which they live when wages exceed unemployment insurance. The marginal benefit of
taking a job in the alternative region is always lower since commuting costs must be incurred
to access this labour market. The agent will only take a job in this region if the wage is
greater than unemployment insurance payment plus the cost of commuting. At a certain point
as the unemployment insurance rises, employment in the opposite region becomes unattractive
and drops out of the equation. This reduces the expected income from being in employment.
The agent will now only accept a job in the home region. This explains why the commuting
mechanism fails to close the disparity once the unemployment insurance rate rises.
Of course, people are free to migrate in this model. This means that once commuting
becomes unattractive, people can leave the region and access the labour market in the opposite
region. This would be attractive when the disparity in Figure 2(b) emerges and increases the
expected wage in Region 2. There is indeed some adjustment and the unemployment rate in
Region 2 rises slightly in response to the shock in Region 1. The adjustment is very small
however and not enough to close the gap. There are two explanations for this lack of migration.
The first is frictional e.g. there are moving costs of 100,000 NOK in the model which provides
some discouragement to moving. This disequilibrium explanation is not capable of explaining
the persistent disparity observed. To understand what is happening, Marston’s amenity theory
must be employed. Most of the residents in Region 1 were also born in Region 1. In the
simulation model, agents prefer to live in the region in which they were born. The strength of
this preference varies from person to person. This amounts to saying that these people have a
willingness to pay to live in their birth region. It is this amenity (which benefits the agent over
their whole life) which inhibits migration and stops the adjustment of the economy rather than
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the one-off moving cost. In this situation, even though there is a large disparity, everyone is
maximising their utility. Region 1 residents trades off the increase in the expected wage which
they could achieve by migrating against the amenity value of living where they were born. This
is an equilibrium solution and can persist in the long term.
Figure 3 shows the same mechanism working in the opposite direction in the case of the
110 km system. There is an unemployment disparity with an unemployment insurance rate of
300,000 NOK, as shown in Figure 3(a). When the insurance rate is reduced to 250,000 NOK,
only disequilibrium disparities are present. The 140 km system behaves in a similar way to
the 110 km system, though a larger reduction in the unemployment insurance is required to
give a sufficiently large incentive for people to migrate or commute to obtain work. In effect,
this incentive creates a net benefit from commuting and hence reintroduces it into the workers’
expected wage considerations.
20%
25%
Unemployment
0%
5%
10%
15%
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
(a) 300,000 NOK
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Figure 3: The effect of a change in Unemployment Insurance: 110 km between Regions with
1000 jobs removed from Region 1 (unbroken line) in year 20.
There is evidence of these kinds of effects in the literature. Meyer (1990) and Bover et al.
(2002) found that as the level of unemployment insurance rose, the duration of a unemployment
spells increased. This was since workers became more selective about which job offers they
would accept, as with the workers in the simulation model. Meyer (1990) showed that when
agents knew their period of eligibility was coming to an end, they were more likely to find work.
This, along with results from the simulation model, suggests that economies with lower levels
of unemployment insurance should experience lower regional disparities as there are incentives
present to induce people to move or commute to obtain employment.
In the model presented in this paper, this unemployment spell can continue ad infinitum
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since there is no limit to how long people can claim the benefit. It was decided to model in this
way for two reasons. Firstly, in many countries when the period of unemployment insurance
comes to an end people are transferred to some kind of social insurance. The continuation
of unemployment insurance in the model presented here accounts for this. Secondly because
modelling this way significantly reduces the complexity of the model while still offering useful
insights.
4.2 The effect of a wage disparity
The effect of a wage disparity on unemployment differentials was monitored. The wage rate in
Region 2 was changed from 400,000 NOK to 375,000, 425,000 and 450,000 NOK. In the systems
with 20 and 50 km, none of the wage disparities that was introduced created an unemployment
disparity. This is due to the low cost of moving or commuting between the regions.
When wages are equal in both regions in the 80 km system, there is no unemployment
disparity, and this also applies to cases where the wage rate in Region 2 is increased. When
the wage rate in Region 2 is lowered to 375,000 NOK, a large disparity opens up between the
regions, as shown in Figure 4. This disparity begins as soon as the wage is lowered but is greatly
exacerbated when the employment shock hits Region 1. The unemployment rate in Region 2,
however, remains very low and is even slightly lower than it was before both the shock and
the wage change. The reason for this is that there is now an asymmetry in the expected wage
calculations of individuals living in both regions. It is beneficial to commute from Region 2 to
Region 1 but not from Region 1 to Region 2. This insulates the labour market in Region 2 from
people commuting in and competing for jobs. This lower unemployment rate helps to increase
the expected wage, even though the nominal wage is lower. The expected wage in Region 1 falls
as the unemployment rate rises. The gap in expected wages is never completely closed due to
the inhibition of migration by the amenity value of living in the birth region.
In the 110 km system, lowering the wage in Region 2 has no effect. This is since the wage
disparity does not give a strong enough incentive for people to move or commute due to the
greater distance involved in this system. Increasing the wage in Region 2 does generate effects.
Figure 5 shows that prior to the shock, there is little difference in unemployment rates when
there is no wage disparity. When the shock hits, a large disparity opens up. When the wage
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Figure 4: The effect of a wage disparity, w2−w1: 80 km between regions, with 1000 jobs removed
from Region 1 (unbroken line) in year 20.
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Figure 5: The effect of a wage disparity, w2 − w1: 110 km between Regions with 1000 jobs
removed from Region 1 (unbroken line) in year 20.
is increased in Region 2, unemployment begins to rise in this region. When the employment
shock hits, unemployment in both regions rises but is always highest in Region 2. As the system
adjusts to the shock, the unemployment rate in Region 1 begins to fall while the rate continues
to rise in Region 2. In this system, the friction in the system actually narrows the disparity
for a period. The gap shows signs of widening towards the end of the monitoring period. The
effect of the wage increase in this case is to shift much of the unemployment from Region 1 to
Region 2. In the 140 km system, a disparity of 25,000 NOK, either positive or negative, has no
discernible effect on the unemployment disparity. When the wage in Region 2 is increased to
450,000 NOK, a similar effect is witnessed to that in the 110 km system.
Summarised, our experiments illustrate that the effect of wage disparities depends on the
distance between the regions. Within the range of reasonable wage disparities that we consider,
unemployment disparities are not induced in the short distance systems, and there is apparently
a marked difference in response between the intermediate 80 km system and the two long dis-
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tance systems. In the 80 km system an unemployment disparity results from a reduced wage in a
region, while unemployment disparities can then only be induced through wage increases in one
of the regions in the long distance systems. Notice, however, that in all cases the region with the
highest wage will be the region with the most unfortunate development in unemployment. The
corresponding unemployment disparities correspond to the Harris-Todaro explanation, where
wage differences are traded off against the probability of receiving a job offer in an equilibrium
solution where the expected wage differential is zero and migration has ceased. It is also accord-
ing to empirical findings in Partridge and Rickman (1996), where wage differentials are found to
be positively related to the unemployment rate. Notice that changes in unemployment primarily
reflect supply side responses to exogenous parameter changes. Job offers are only affected to
the degree that moving decisions of households influence the level of local sector activities in a
region.
There is less evidence in the literature of how local employment shocks affect unemployment.
In general one would expect wages to respond at least slightly to such large changes in employ-
ment (1000 out of 4000 basic sector jobs are removed in this experiment). It is, however, useful
to consider the case of exogenous wages given that there is significant evidence of unresponsive
wages in the literature (see Section 2.1.3).
4.3 The effect of varying the cost of commuting
The cost per km of commuting was changed from 2.5 NOK/km to 2, 3 and 5 NOK/km. None of
those changes to the cost of commuting caused an unemployment disparity in the 20 and 50 km
systems. This is since the low distances mean that it is always inexpensive to commute relative
to the excess of the wage over the unemployment insurance rate.
There are no changes to the unemployment rates for a decrease or a small increase in the 80 km
system. Figure 6 shows that when the cost is increased to 5 NOK/km, a disparity opens up as
people no longer find it beneficial to commute between the two regions. An increase in the cost
of commuting has no effect in the 110 km system since it was already very expensive. Reducing
the cost to 2 NOK/km however, closes the unemployment gap as people now find it beneficial
to commute to find employment. This is shown in Figure 7. When the distance between the
regions is increased to 140 km, none of the considered changes to the cost of commuting affect
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Figure 6: The effect of a change in commuting costs: 80 km between Regions with 1000 jobs
removed from Region 1 (unbroken line) in year 20.
the unemployment outcomes.
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Figure 7: The effect of a change in commuting costs: 110 km between Regions with 1000 jobs
removed from Region 1 (unbroken line) in year 20.
In general, an increase in the cost of commuting can open up an unemployment disparity
in any system. The potential for opening up, or increasing, a disparity is positively related
to the distance between the two regions. In a case with a long distance between the regions
even a modest increase in commuting costs can lead to a substantial spatial unemployment
disparity. Similarly, a reduction in the cost of commuting may act to reduce any unemployment
disparity in all the systems. Our experiments provide useful information on how for instance
transport innovations or changes in petrol prices may affect a regional labour market with specific
characteristics (parameter values). As an example of one important contribution, our approach
can be used to identify critical distances where specific changes in transportation policy can
induce a more favourable kind of labour market equilibrium.
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4.4 The effect of introducing a location-specific amenity and varying the
strength of the residential preference
The utility function introduced in Section 3.2 included a parameter Ω representing the willingness
to pay for an amenity in Region 1. In the example illustrated in Figure 8 we assume that
Ω = 50, 000. The important point to be made from the figure is that the amenity causes a
persistent unemployment disparity disfavouring Region 1. This reflects an increased population
(labour stock) in Region 1, while the number of jobs in the region is largely fixed (there is
some increase in local sector jobs to reflect the increase in population), and it is not feasible to
commute from Region 1 to Region 2 due to the large distances involved (110 km). Even when
the unemployment rate in Region 1 exceeds that in Region 2, migration continues. This suggests
that the extra utility provided by the amenity compensates for the higher risk of unemployment
associated with living in that region and the disutility people born in Region 2 experinace from
living away from their home region. Hence, our results offer an explanation for observations
where unemployment rates tend to be highest in areas with amenities which are attractive
to everyone. This supports Marston’s (1985) approach, where attractive amenities are traded
off by high unemployment in an equilibrium explanation of persistent spatial unemployment
disparities. It also represents a possible explanation for the empirical finding (Partridge and
Rickman 1997) that regions (US states) characterised by many inhabitants living in the same
residences for at least five years have greater unemployment rates.
The disparity takes some time to open up. This is most likely due to discounting. When
agents in Region 2 consider moving to Region 1, they consider the discounted value of the
amenity. Some older people will not expect to live long enough to benefit from the amenity.
As younger people are born into the system, they discount the benefit over their entire lifetime.
This gives a higher present value of the amenity to a young person than to an older person. To
capture this effect Figure 8 refers to a longer time perspective than the other experiments in
this paper, and we have dropped the shock represented by the removal of 1000 jobs from Region
1 to keep clear of disturbing additional effects in this experiment.
The distribution of the willingness to pay to live in the region of birth was varied. As
explained in Section 3.2 each person in the model has a value for this preference drawn from
a uniform probability distribution. The range of this preference was altered in several ways
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Figure 8: The effect of an amenity worth 50,000 NOK per year to each person living in Region
1 (unbroken line). The distance between the regions is 110 km.
however, only lowering the limits by 0.5 produced any noticeable effects and even then only in
the long distance systems. When the strength of preferences is lowered in the 110 km system,
the disparity is reduced slightly although not closed. When the shock hits Region 1, it is the
unemployment rate in Region 2 which responds initially, as can be seen in Figure 9. This is
since people are now more willing to migrate to gain work. The 140 km system responds in a
similar way.
The argument following from Figure 9 can of course be reversed: the presence of innate
residential site preferences may increase a spatial unemployment disparity. Such preferences
contribute to reduce spatial mobility. Although not presented here, removing the residential site
preference component from the model results in large fluctuations in each regions population
depending on where jobs are available. In this system there is no persistent disparity in un-
employment. This suggests that even a mild residential site preference is a sufficient condition
for an unemployment disparity to persist. In cases where workers are not basically attached
to a specific area, the two groups of workers naturally also tend to be more evenly distributed
between the two regions in a long term equilibrium solution.
4.5 Experiments involving a relocation of jobs
Some experiments were conducted where the jobs were moved to Region 2 rather than being
removed from the system. The results of experiments involving a relocation of jobs gave similar
results to those already outlined. Disparities were opened and closed with the same parameter
configurations as above. As an example, Figure 10 refers to the experiment where commuting
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Figure 9: The effect of a change in the strength of residential site preferences: 110 km between
Regions with 1000 jobs removed from Region 1 (unbroken line) in year 20.
costs are reduced from 2.5 to 2.0 NOK per km. Similar to the case in Figure 7(b) this closes
the spatial unemployment disparity. It is natural, however, that the aggregate unemployment
remains at the same level after the intraregional relocation of production activities, while this
was not the case when jobs were removed from the system.
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Figure 10: The effect of a change in the cost of commuting in the 110 km system with 1000 jobs
moved from Region 1 (unbroken line) to Region 2 in year 20.
One interesting feature of systems with an unemployment disparity is related to the vacancy
rate. This does not appear in Figure 10(b), but even 20 years after the shock there are a high
number of vacant positions in Region 2 (around 30% of the new jobs remain unfilled) even
though there is a high unemployment rate in Region 1. This would presumably constrain the
growth of Region 2. The reduction of the cost of commuting closes this disparity allowing firms
in Region 2 to find the workers they require while reducing the unemployment rate in Region 1.
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4.6 The experiments under endogenous wages and basic sector jobs
The introduction of endogenous wages and basic sector jobs provided results consistent with
prior expectations i.e. rises in unemployment trigger falls in wages which generates new jobs.
Figure 11 shows what happens when 1000 jobs are removed from Region 1 in situations with
exogenous and endogenous wages and basic sector jobs.
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Figure 11: The effect of endogenous wages and basic sector jobs in the 110 km system with 1000
jobs removed from Region 1 (unbroken line) in year 20.
While there is still an unemployment disparity in the case with endogenous wages, the disparity
is around 5 percentage points lower. This is since the rise in unemployment in Region 1 causes
a fall in wages. This induces firms to hire additional workers which helps to reduce the impact
of the initial job losses. The precise magnitude of the effect will depend on the elasticity of
wages with respect to unemployment and the elasticity of basic sector jobs to wages. Wages
are assumed to have an elasticity of 0.1 based on evidence presented in Section 3.4 while the
elasticity of basic sector jobs is assumed to be equal to unity. This experiment demonstrates
that an economy with at least some flexibility in wages and job creation will experience lower
unemployment disparities.
We will not present more results based on the experiments under endogenous wages and
basic sector jobs. As stated above the experiments provided results representing reasonable
modifications of the cases where wages and the number of basic sector jobs are exogenous. We
have primarily focused on the cases with no price adjustments in this paper, to concentrate
on the partial effects of changes in other exogenous variables in a numerically based approach
analogous to comparative static analysis.
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5 An empirical example
The aim of the paper was to gain an insight into spatial unemployment patterns. The example
of Rogaland county in the south west part of Norway is presented here. The main employment
centre of the region is the city of Stavanger. The city is also the centre of Norway’s oil and
gas industry and is therefore a very prosperous city. The paradox is that the unemployment
rate in the city has tended to be higher than in lagging peripheral areas further inland. One of
many such areas is the municipality of Suldal. Figure 12 shows the unemployment rate in the
municipalities of Stavanger and Suldal for the years 1992 to 2007.
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Figure 12: The unemployment rate in Stavanger (broken line) and Suldal: 1992-2007
The unemployment rate in Stavanger has been higher than Suldal for the entire period,
even when taking into account cyclical fluctuation in the rate. The pattern resembles some
of the output generated from the model, in particular the figures relating to wage disparities
(Figures 4 and 5 and the presence of an amenity (Figure 8). Both of these explanations could
be appropriate.
According to Marston (1985) excessive migration costs represent a disequilibrium explana-
tion to unemployment rate differentials between areas; excessive migration costs might put the
equilibrating forces out of action. Similarly, Partridge and Rickman (1997) point to the fact that
utility improvements cannot be obtained through migration in cases with high monetary and
psychological costs of household relocation. In such situations it makes good sense to implement
active policy interventions to stimulate aggregate demand in areas with high unemployment.
Based on a set of observations Marston also points out, however, that wages tend to be higher
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in high unemployment areas. Such empirical findings cannot be explained within the disequi-
librium context, and they contradict the idea that excess labour supply in an area results in
lower wages. Hence, Marston claims that the main component of area unemployment rate dif-
ferentials are local equilibrium components, like for example specific local amenities (such as
those present in a regional centre such as Stavanger). The main reason is that disequilibrium
unemployment will be eliminated even if only a small fraction of workers migrate in response to
an unfavourable labour market situation i.e. migration adjustments forces are strong relative to
disequilibrating shocks. Marston’s empirical work indicates that, in general, migration flows are
able to restore spatial equilibrium within a year, far less than the 16 years shown in Figure 12.
This has the important policy implication that government funding programmes are useless as
means of reducing unemployment in an area such as Stavanger.
Wage disparities could also explain this pattern. High wages in Stavanger encourage people
from the more peripheral areas to commute to Stavanger to benefit from higher wages and a
more differentiated labour market. The incentives to commute in the opposite direction are
lower. This means that jobs in Stavanger are occupied both by residents and people living in
outlying areas while jobs in the outlying areas are occupied almost exclusively by people resident
there. It is important to state that this pattern is replicated for many pairs of industrial centres
and lagging areas in the region.
6 Conclusion
The experiments showed that the existence of persistent unemployment disparities is dependent
not only upon the physical geography in which the labour markets are located but also on a
variety of other factors. Wage disparities, unemployment insurance, the presence of amenities
and a desire to reside in the region of birth were all important in determining the spatial
distribution of unemployment. All of these factors contribute to explaining why the Blanchard
and Katz model is not able to explain the persistent unemployment disparities observed in
countries around the world.
The simulation approach employed here is relatively new to the area of spatial disparities.
It has proved uniquely successful in simultaneously modelling equilibrium and disequilibrium
explanations of unemployment disparities in situations where commuting and migration are
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possible. The main result was that higher levels of friction in the system increase the probability
of a disparity emerging and persisting. This was illustrated through the introduction of a large
shock to one of the regions in the model. This extreme example clearly illustrates the points
raised although many of the results would apply even in the absence of such shocks. When
regions are well integrated, generally when the distance between them is low, the impact of
shocks is evenly spread. When they are isolated, only partial adjustment takes place with the
majority of the effects concentrating in the affected area. In the case of Stavanger there are
two obvious policy options which can be considered. On the demand side, jobs could be created
in Stavanger to mop up unemployment. On the supply side, commuting connections between
Stavanger and peripheral areas such as Suldal could be improved to allow unemployed people
in Stavanger to access their labour markets. Incentives to migrate could be increased through
a lowering of unemployment insurance and disincentives to migration such as moving costs, or
taxes could be removed.
The results produced by the model suggest that creating jobs in Stavanger could have un-
intended consequences. If the new jobs lower unemployment, the expected wage of living in
Stavanger would rise. This could encourage new migration to the area and increase the un-
employment rate back to its previous level. This is the crucial distinction between equilibrium
and disequilibrium unemployment. Deviations from the equilibrium expected wage will trigger
adjustments back to equilibrium through changes in the nominal wage or the unemployment
rate. With respect to unemployment, such a policy intervention would be entirely ineffectual in
the medium to long term.
Supply side measures could be more effective. Any factors which impede migration should be
minimised. The success of such a policy would depend on the precise reasons for the disparity.
Even if migration were costless, it would not be certain that people would wish to move from
Stavanger to more rural areas. Reductions in the cost of commuting could prove effective
although the scope for making such improvements is often limited. A reduction in unemployment
insurance would increase the cost of living in a high amenity area where the unemployment
rate was high. This should encourage at least some migration to the low unemployment area.
Lowering rates of unemployment insurance may not be feasible given that it would have to be
implemented nationally and that such moves can prove controversial in political terms.
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There is a third option which appears counter-intuitive at first. Instead of introducing jobs
into Stavanger, it could be the case that introducing them into the low unemployment areas
would prove more effective in reducing aggregate unemployment. Such a move would increase
the expected wage in rural locations. This could encourage some of the unemployed people in
Stavanger to forgo the amenity value of the city to take up work in other municipalities. It could
also reduce the flow of migrants from rural areas to Stavanger. This is particularly true if those
born in such areas have an innate preference to reside there. Increasing the amenity value of
the rural areas may also be effective although there is no clear way to achieve this. However,
preferences for urban areas over rural areas could naturally change over time.
The approach used here provides many possible avenues for exploration. In particular, the
dynamics through which the system adjusts to shocks could be monitored an insights gained
into how such mechanisms are affected by various parameter configuration. The results yielded
by this approach go beyond what is possible with a purely analytical approach while avoiding
the difficulties inherent with empirical research. The model also provides a useful contribution
to the policy debate around how best to deal with unemployment disparities and shows that
solutions which may seem obvious will not necessarily produce the desired results.
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